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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether reflecting on the future is an activity that is
distinct from reflecting on the past or present, and, if so, what are its
distinguishing characteristics. The argument begins with a review of Dewey’s
(1933) concept of reflective thinking, still not surpassed in its detailed analysis.
Dewey’s model of reflection is discussed and some limitations noted. An
alternative model to Dewey’s, labelled “reflection as comparison” is outlined,
and shown to include the essential components of Dewey’s model, while also
extending it to cover assumptional filters. An important role of reflection is to
articulate these filters. To demonstrate the reflection-as-comparison model, a
case study is presented: a feasibility study for an online community information
system in rural Australia. This is asserted to comprise reflection on the future in
that it considers alternative futures, actively seeks to identify and bypass
assumptional filters, and reperceives this problem situation as a set of
interlocking social systems as well as an online information system.
REFLECTION ON THE FUTURE
Given the long lead times and life
cycles of IT projects, Information Systems
managers need to reflect on the future. This
paper considers the possibilities of reflection
on the future: whether this is an activity that is
distinct from reflecting on the past or present,
and, if so, what are its distinguishing
characteristics. The paper distinguishes two
kinds of future: future as extended habit, and
future as taking new, unpredictable paths. The
focus here is on the latter kind of future, which
is often more relevant in the development of
complex information systems. By creating a
new perspective of reflection, labelled the
“reflection-as-comparison” model it becomes
clear that reflection on the unexpected future is

possible; and a later case study demonstrates
the usefulness of this model of reflection.

THE NATURE OF CRITICAL
REFLECTION

Though the online encyclopedia
Wikipedia offers 10 distinct meanings of
“reflection”, this paper focuses on the meaning
attributed for education - summarized by the
Wikipedia as simply “the art of turning
experience into learning” (Wikipedia 2005).
Reflection appears to have first been used in
this sense by Dewey (1933), in parallel with
the more explicit term “reflective thinking.”
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
defines reflection, in the context of
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philosophy: “the mode, operation, or faculty
by which the mind has knowledge of itself and
its operations, or by which it deals with the
ideas received from sensation and perception”
(Oxford 1973). The first reference in this sense
was dated 1690. However, the original sense
of reflection was the optical, which the Shorter
Oxford dates from 1555, and defines as “The
action, on the part of surfaces, of thrown back
light...falling upon them” (Oxford 1973).
Given this primacy of the optical sense of the
word, this paper uses an optical metaphor to
illuminate the philosophical meaning.
Though reflection in the philosophical
sense has a very long history - for example, it
is very close to the theoria of Aristotle in his
Nicomachean Ethics (Russell 1961) - this
discussion begins with the work of Dewey.
Dewey’s model of reflection
Dewey’s book How We Think appears
to be still the most comprehensive work
written on reflection (from a philosophical
standpoint). The first edition of How We Think
was published in 1910, with an enlarged and
slightly revised second edition in 1933.
According to Dewey (1933, pp.107ff),
“reflection occurs when one thing signifies or
indicates another.” Dewey here is suggesting
that full reflection produces a theory of cause
and effect. For Dewey, reflection begins with a
“perplexed troubled, or confused situation,”
and then entails five phases:
1.

Suggestion: the mind leaps forward to a
possible solution. If the solution seems
feasible, it is applied, and full reflection
does not occur. Otherwise, these phases
take place:

2.

Intellectualization of the perplexity into a
specific problem to be solved or question
to be answered: i.e. placing the perplexity
into a relevant context;

3.

Development of a hypothesis to guide
observation in collection of empirical
data;

4.

Elaboration of the hypothesis, or
“reasoning”;

5.

Testing the hypothesis, either by overt
action or thought experiment.
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CONTRIBUTION
This paper’s chief contribution to IS
practice lies in its demonstration that
reflection on the future is not only possible
– and makes sense, in terms of Dewey’s
original conception of reflective thinking,
but can also be valuable in the development
of complex
technological information
systems. The case study in this paper shows
how reflection on the ways in which a
facility is likely to be used can be used to
drive the development of the resulting
information system. Though no claim is
made that such reflection is an innovation,
the argument is that making the reflection
process explicit is likely to result in an
information system that is more useful, and
thus more widely used than would
otherwise be the case.

Phases 3 to 5 are different in kind from
the first stage. Dewey (1933, p.109) notes
phase 2 as “a process of intellectualizing what
at first is merely an emotional quality of the
whole situation.” In phase 3, having
transferred the “perplexity” into a coherent
“problem”, counterfactual thinking can be
applied. Dewey notes (1933: 115) “the
sequence of five phases is not fixed” - they
need not occur in that order, and they need not
all occur.
Three limitations can be noted on
Dewey’s model of reflection: firstly, it applies
to “thinking,” and thus to individuals. There is
no explicit reference in How We Think to the
idea that reflection could be a collective
activity,
achieved
through
discussion.
Secondly, Dewey’s model is a proposition
(how reflection can occur) rather than a
statement of empirical fact (how reflection
does occur): perhaps other processes are
possible, and perhaps How We Think should
have been entitled How I Think. Thirdly,
Dewey presents reflection as an entirely
intellectual process, with no affective or
intuitive element.
Part of Dewey’s argument is that
humans are prone to leap to a single
conclusion, and not waver from it, even in the
face of contrary evidence. Experimental work
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(for example, by Kahneman, Tversky, and
Slovic, 1982) tends to support this contention.
Many other sources could be cited here,
including other writers on cognitive
psychology and evolutionary psychology, as
well as Freud and Wittgenstein, but space
precludes a detailed study of this point.
Successors to Dewey
Building on the work of Dewey,
several writers have addressed the three
limitations noted above. Heron (1996), in his
model of co-operative inquiry, allows for both
individual and shared reflection. Co-operative
inquiry begins with individual reflection by
several participants, who later compare those
reflections in a shared-reflection session.
Kemmis (1985, p.141) is more explicit: for
him, “reflection is not a purely ‘internal’,
psychological process: it is action-oriented and
historically embedded.” And of course, if
reflection is extended beyond one individual, it
becomes discussion, which can be treated as
an argument, becoming subject to the
constraints and possibilities of argumentative
inquiry (Walton, 1998). Mezirow (1981), after
interviewing women returning to college,
empirically delineated 10 stages of what he
calls “perspective transformation.” These are
similar to Dewey’s five phases, though
naturally more detailed. Recent writers,
including Boud, Keogh, and Walker (1985),
have argued that the affective element must be
considered, particularly in the context of
reflection in education. They list a sequence of
three phases of reflection (not reported as

being based on empirical work): returning to
experience, attending to feelings, and reevaluating experience.
All three of these extensions of
Dewey’s thought were found useful for
incorporation into a variant model, to be
described next: namely, that reflection can be
either an individual or a group activity, that it
can include an affective component (just as it
can include near-formal hypotheses), and that
plausible alternative sets of phases may be
delineated.
Reflection as comparison
With the aid of an optical metaphor, I
shall now propose an alternative model of
reflection, less hypothesis-oriented than
Dewey’s prescriptive definition, but more in
accordance with the dictionary meaning of the
term. This model, which can be labelled
“reflection as comparison” involves three
elements, as shown in Figure 1: a reflector (the
person or group reflecting), the existing
situation, and a standard situation. In this
model, the reflector compares the existing
situation with a standard situation - which may
be a past experience of the same phenomenon,
a similar situation in another domain, or a
desired goal. The focus of reflection is why
and how the current situation differs from the
standard. Varying the standard situation and/or
the difference between that and the current
situation corresponds to Dewey’s stages of
hypothesis formation and testing.

Reflector
Filters

Current
situation

Possible change

Standard
situation

Figure 1: The reflection-as-comparison model
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Translating
the
reflection-ascomparison model into the closest equivalent
of Dewey’s five-phase model, both begin with
the reflector experiencing perplexity. For the
reflection-as-comparison model, the stages
are:
1.

The reflector perceives (through a filter) a
current situation, as problematic in some
way.

3b. Varying the standard situation: might it be
possible to find a public telephone and
change the time of the appointment?
3c. Considering actions that would bring the
two situations into closer alignment: such
as taking the subway express rather than
the elevated line.

Applying this model to Dewey’s
example of “practical deliberation” (Dewey
1933, p.91):

Though the reflection-as-comparison
model does not step through Dewey’s five
phases, the end result is the same, and the
addition of the filters is potentially useful.
(However, the reflection-as-comparison model
does not fit closely with Dewey’s other two
types of reflection, involving observation and
experiment.) Lewin’s (1946) form of action
research involves cycling between planning,
action, and reflection. In both the reflection-ascomparison model and Dewey’s five-phase
model, the reflection component is much
broader than the narrower concept of
reflection, as described by Lewin, and almost
equivalent to an entire action research cycle
(List 2006). Dewey’s view of reflection, as
noted above, has been interpreted by later
writers, such as Kolb (1984) and Korthagen
(2005) as a cyclical process - though Kolb’s
cycle of “experiential learning” is rooted as
much in the writings of Jung (on personality
types) and Lewin (on action research) as in
those of Dewey. Though it is possible to
criticize Kolb in this regard (as does Miettinen
2000), it is clear from Dewey’s five phases
that recursiveness is possible. For example, if
the hypothesis formed in phases 3 is not
confirmed in phase 5, the reflector may return
to phase 3 and form another hypothesis.

1.

Filters to reflection

2.

The reflector perceives (also through a
filter), an initial “standard situation” as
comparison. This standard situation can
have several sources: it may be a leapt-to
conclusion, it may reflect past experience,
or it may be a desired future situation.

3.

The reflector considers what changes
might be necessary to bring the two
situations into alignment. This can be
achieved in any combination of three
ways:
3a. Reperceiving the current situation, by
varying its filter (perhaps, after
considering the alternatives, it may
not be a problem after all).
3b. Changing the standard situation, by
adopting a different standard for the
comparison.
3c. Reconfiguring the possible changes
needed to bring the two situations
into closer alignment.

2.

The reflector perceives a current situation:
that he is running late for an appointment.
(His filter includes the assumptions that
the clock on 16th Street is correct, and the
affective component that the appointment
must be kept: that it is not possible to
arrive late, nor to modify the
appointment.)
He perceives a standard situation “due at
124th Street by 1pm.” Filter: the
assumption that his memory is accurate.

3a. Reperceiving the current situation:
perhaps the clock on 16th Street had
previously proved inaccurate.
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In terms of the optical metaphor, the
filters through which the reflectors see the two
situations are equivalent to refraction as well
as reflection. As noted by Mezirow (1991,
pp.101-102 and 114) Dewey did not take
account of this “framing”, as Mezirow and
Schön label it. Different contexts will call
forth other refractions, as noted by many
writers discussing related concepts using
different labels. These include the double-loop
learning of Argyris, Putnam, and Smith
(1985), the critically heuristic boundary
questions of Ulrich (2000), the critical
reflection of Kemmis (1985), the premise
reflection of Mezirow (1991), Morgan’s
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(1997) images of organization, the work of
Linstone (1999) on multiple perspectives, the
“designed blindness” described by Friedman
(1992) in relation to program theory, and the
“undiscussables” addressed in Appreciative
Inquiry (Cooperrider, Whitney, and Stavros
2004). Continuing the optical imagery, it is as
if coloured glass filters were placed between
the reflector and the two situations, as shown
by the thick horizontal lines in Figure 1.
Though it might be considered
desirable to remove the filters (or at least
replace them by clear glass) this will generally
not be feasible: there are simply too many
aspects that could be reflected on. A selection
must always be made - wittingly or
unwittingly - with the attendant risk that some
vital aspect is overlooked. And as Kemmis
(1985, p.147) notes, “reflection is shaped by
and shapes ideology.”
The filters in Figure 1 correspond to
Kemmis’s concept of ideology, with the
reflector perceiving only some aspects of the
current situation, and only some aspects of the
standard. However, ideology is only one
reason for limiting reflection; simple lack of
foresight is another. Ideology does not change
easily, but lack of foresight can be
acknowledged with a statement such as “Oops!
I didn’t think of that.” Thus Kemmis’s (1985)
statement could be extended to “reflection is
shaped by and shapes assumptions.” Filtering
seems to be inevitable; even were it possible to
remove all assumptional blinkers, the pressure
of time would serve to limit the extent of
reflection. As Alvesson and Skjöldberg (2000,
p.246), noting the correspondences between
reflection and reflexivity, observe, “the whole
idea of reflexivity, as we see it, is the very
ability to break away from a frame of
reference and to look at what is it not capable
of saying.” In terms of the reflection-ascomparison model, this function is performed
by changing the filters.
If (as often) the comparison is a
normative one, the reflector will be seeking
change: a way to vary the current situation (or
its successor) to more closely resemble the
comparison situation. Figure 1 may be
compared with Ulrich’s (2000, p.252) triangle
of facts, values, and system, with the Reflector
here roughly equivalent to Ulrich’s system, the

current situation corresponding to Ulrich’s
facts, and the comparison situation with
Ulrich’s values.
This reflection-as-comparison model is
compatible with Dewey’s definition, as
summarized above, and explained in detail in
chapters I and VII of Dewey (1933). The
“standard situation” can be either a desired
state of affairs, or a current hypothesis. This
model is similar to ideas that are expressed by
Morris and Moore (2000), and Lynch and
Joham (2004), but that are not explicitly
spelled out by those writers as a basis of
reflection.
Reflection as a group activity
As noted above, Dewey conceived
reflection, perhaps because his filter was
“thinking”, as an individual activity. Even in
the chapters on pedagogy, collective reflection
was not mentioned. Recent writers on
reflection and reflective thinking, such as
Kemmis (1985), and Heron (1996) almost take
it for granted that reflection can be a collective
activity. Raelin (2001) notes that “Taylor
(1997) even suggests that without the medium
of relationships reflection can be impotent and
hollow, lacking the genuine discourse
necessary for thoughtful and in-depth
behavioral change.” In the reflection-ascomparison model, either individual thinking
or collective discourse can form the basis of
reflection.
Reflection and intuition
A limitation of Dewey’s model is its
intellectualist treatment of reflection, as if
every reflector is a scientist, forming explicit
propositions, then testing them. Though this is
certainly one way of dealing with a
problematic situation, it is not the only way.
Other writers, including Ryle (1949) and
Polanyi (1958) have argued that much human
knowledge is tacit: unable to be expressed
verbally, and thus not testable using Dewey’s
five phases. Recent writers on tacit knowledge
have written of a connection between that and
reflection. Thus von Krogh, Ichijo, and
Nonaka (1996) describe a four-stage process
of conveying tacit knowledge by using
reflection to translate it into explicit
knowledge, then back again. Similarly, Raelin
(1997) observes that reflection is the process
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by which tacit knowledge is converted into
explicit knowledge.
Though it would seem unproductive to
unilaterally redefine reflection to include
intuition, it is possible to envisage an
intermediate state, that might be labelled
“intuitive reflection”. This is a matter of
mentally juggling the perceived problem, a
standard situation, and the changes necessary
to bring the two into closer alignment.
As an example of tacit reflection, I may
hear on a radio program a snatch of unfamiliar
classical music. (The problem situation is that
I do not know the composer, and wish to.)
After a few seconds’ listening, I form the
opinion that it is definitely by Beethoven. (So
the standard situation is that this is a work by
Beethoven). Though I have never heard this
work before, I not only know the composer,
but I know that I know it. Such a feeling of
certainty, on experiencing only a tiny part of a
pattern, is one form of intuition. (There’s a
slight chance that I am wrong; the music might
be a pastiche - but I dismiss that.) Step 3c in
the reflection-as-comparison model (bringing
the two situations into alignment) is not
consciously needed here: it occurred
intuitively. Later, I realize that my doubts
about the possible pastiche can be resolved by
changing the problem situation (step 3a): my
certainty is not that the music was by
Beethoven, but that it was in the style of
Beethoven.
Since Dewey (1933, p.9) defines
reflection as “active, persistent, and careful
consideration”, this example, in his terms, did
not amount to reflection. This demonstrates
that the reflection-as-comparison model can
accommodate this more intuitive form of
reflection.
Futures and predictability
The basis of my argument is that in
many respects the future is very similar to the
past: neither can be fully known, and neither
can be directly perceived. In addition, the
shorthand forms “the past” and “the future”
are equally misleading. Since both exist only
in the mind - as observed by philosophers as
far back as Saint Augustine, (397) - there are
as many futures (and pasts) as minds. Because
of socialization, these pasts and futures may
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not vary greatly within a culture, but the
further they are removed from the present, the
more varied are those perceived futures and
pasts.
The main thrust of recent writings on
“futures thinking” (always in the plural) is that
many futures are possible. This position is
demonstrated by most of the contributors to
the authoritative Knowledge Base of Futures
Studies (Slaughter, 1996) and permeates the
theoretical work of Bell (2003). Allowing,
then, that there are multiple futures in two
senses, how can this be reconciled with the
short-term accuracy of much forecasting
(Armstrong, 2001)? The obvious resolution is
a model of increasing divergence. The
following figure depicts this graphically, with
time running from left to right. The dotted
vertical line denotes the present, while the
horizontal line on the left shows the recent past
and near future. For a short time, the future
continues, as effectively a single line, but as
probabilities of change begin to snowball, a
number of ever-more-divergent possible
futures appear.

Figure 2: From future to futures
Despite the popular view that it is
impossible to predict the future, elements of
the near-term future are often quite
predictable. From forecasting the number of
primary school enrolments five years from
now, to predicting how a frequently-seen
streetscape will look tomorrow morning, much
of the short-term future is either (all but) preordained, or will vary within only a tiny range.
The more general a prediction, the more likely
it is to be true. If I predict that tomorrow in
this city, there will be between 1 and 3
millimetres of rainfall, I am very likely to be
wrong. But if I extend the prediction by
multiplication to the whole of this year,
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guessing between 365 and 1095 mm, I’d have
been correct every year for the last century.
The relevance of this line of thought for
reflection is that two kinds of future can be
distinguished: the apparently straight line on
the right of the present in Figure 2, and the
diverging curves farther to the right. The first
represents the future as habitual or cyclical, the
second as less predictable. Thus because of the
cyclical and repetitive aspects of much human
behaviour, much of the near future will be
essentially the same as the recent past. (For
clarification, I am of course exaggerating the
difference between the “two futures” - in
reality, the first shades into the second.)
Is it possible to reflect on the future?
It may at first seem impossible to
reflect on the future: how can one reflect on
something that has not occurred: does not
Dewey’s model of reflection preclude
reflection on future events? Though it may be
interpreted thus, Dewey does not seem to have
made such an interpretation. Each of the three
examples of reflection given by Dewey (1933,
pp.91-94) - meeting an appointment (practical
deliberation), a pole projecting from a ferry
(reflection on an observation), and the
movement of soapsud bubbles (reflection
involving experiment) - is a situation that is
not intrinsically time-bound. Dewey refers to
reflection as anticipation, for example in the
act of planting seeds (1933, p.18), and notes
that “it has been suggested that reflective
thinking involves a look into the future, a
forecast, an anticipation, or a prediction and
that this should be listed as a sixth aspect or
phase” (1933, p.117).
Haroutunian-Gordon (1994) points out
that, for Dewey, “reflective thinking, or
‘thinking’ as he understood the term involved
discovering what is already there but
previously
unrecognized.”
Comparing
Dewey’s concept of thinking with those of
Wittgenstein and (in particular) Gadamer, she
suggests that the outcome of thinking
(referring to a process that others label
reflection) can be the creation rather than the
discovery of meaning, particularly through
conversation. This also amounts to a futureoriented view of reflection.

Senge et al. (2005, p.86) also support
the concept of reflection on the future: “From
John Dewey on, theorists have argued that we
learn from the past through cycles of action
and reflection that lead to new actions. But
[Brian] Arthur was pointing to a different type
of learning process where we learn instead
from a future that has not yet happened and
from continually discovering our part in
bringing that future to pass.” This view
specifically incorporates the role of the
reflector in creating the anticipated future –
which in the reflection-as-comparison model
takes the form of varying the three parameters,
as explained below under the heading of
“Tightening the triangle.”
Boud, Keogh, and Walker (1985, p.9)
take the view that reflection occurs in three
stages: before, during, and after an expected
experience. Loughran (1996) makes a similar
argument, distinguishing between anticipatory,
contemporaneous, and retrospective reflection.
Reflection-before and anticipatory reflection
are both forms of reflection on the future.
Likewise, Schön (1983) distinguishes between
“reflection in action” (reflection concurrent
with action) and “reflection on action”
(reflection following the action). Extending the
stages of Boud, Keogh, and Walker (1985) one
might add “reflection for action” (reflection in
anticipation of action).
For some types of professionals studied
by Schön, such as medical practitioners, it is
reasonable to argue that reflection on the
future may no different from reflection on the
past. This is the future as habit, described in
the previous section. In repetitive professional
work, the medical practitioners of whom
Schön writes might experience a Deweyan
perplexity related to the treatment of a
particular patient, reflect on that, and apply the
solution found to the next relevant instance of
that ailment. However other types of
professional practice may not be able to
translate learning about past cases directly into
the application of future cases.
A clear instance of a very different type
of professional practice is information systems
consultation, in which neither consultant nor
clients may never have encountered a
particular perplexity before, because IS
applications tend to be expensive and long-
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lasting. Even if an application is not the client
organization’s first exercise of that type, after
the typical lapse of a decade or so, it is likely
that the no individuals who dealt with the
previous development may still be employed
by either firm. Thus for all involved, the
development of a particular application may be
the first example of its type. Reflection on this
opens up many possibilities, as represented in
the diverging lines on the right of Figure 2:
this is true “reflection on the future.”
The reflection-as-comparison model
has no inherent limitations on reflection on the
future. When reflection is on the past or on the
present (Schön’s reflection-on-action or
reflection-in-action), the “standard situation”
can be a previous situation, or a counterfactual
in the traditional sense. When habit or cyclical
patterns are involved, the future is effectively
the same as the past, so reflection on that type
of future is equivalent to reflection on the past.
However, if the topic of reflection is a
situation not previously experienced, the
“standard situation” is unpredictable, and
reflection on multiple possibilities is useful. A
useful notion here is the concept of
counterfactuality. As used by leading writers
on this subject (Lewis 1973, Roese 1997,
Ferguson 1999) it refers to alternative
possibilities for the past, branching out to
alternative presents. In the sense of Dewey’s
third stage of reflection, “counterfactual” has
the same meaning, but transfers the branching
point from the past to the present. In the
language of futurists, such counterfactuals are
labelled as images or visions of the future
(Nanus 1992). When multiple standard
situations are envisaged, they amount to
scenarios of the future, as described by
futurists such as Ringland (1998) and van der
Heijden (1996). Other recent writers on futures
studies, though not using the term “reflection,”
have developed approaches that use reflective
processes to question the future. These include
the “integral futures” of Slaughter (2003,
chapter 11) and the Causal Layered Analysis
of Inayatullah (2004).
Tightening the triangle
A practical application of the
reflection-as-comparison model, when one is
faced with a difficult problem, is to explicitly
vary each of the three aspects of the reflective
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triangle. This could be labelled “triangle
tightening,” and would proceed as follows:
1.

How might I reperceive the current
situation, by varying the input filter? (In
practice, “how” is often translated into
“from whose viewpoint.”)

2.

If no standard situation seems relevant,
change whatever output filter I might be
using. (A well-informed person from a
different background might see my filters
more clearly than I do; I would be foolish
to ignore such perceptions.)

3.

How can the reperceived current situation
and standard situation be brought into
alignment? (If the standard situation is a
desired one, this will involved changing
the current situation, which in this context
will be a “problem.”)

4.

Continue adjusting all three elements until
there is some resolution. This resolution
need not be “solving the problem” - it
may, for example, produce a division into
several different problems, or an answer
to a question that initially seems entirely
different.

These steps sound straightforward, but
it is not easy to detect one’s own assumptions:
not without comparing them with the
assumptions of others, and remaining open to
other interpretations - the difficulties of which
were noted by Argyris (1991). For that reason,
effective use of reflection-as-comparison
requires exposure of the model to a wide range
of stakeholders, as demonstrated by the
following case study.
A case study of reflecting on the future
As an example of reflection-ascomparison applied to the uncertain future, the
author and a colleague recently won a
consultancy project advising on the feasibility
of an online community information system.
This example will be used as a case study, not
because it was a groundbreaking project
conceptually, but because it is a clear example
of the need to reflect on the future, and of how
reflection-as-comparison was used for this
purpose.
The project involved a feasibility study
and strategic plan for a group of five shires
(local government areas) in western Victoria,
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Australia. For the past ten years or so, the
shires had co-operated in maintaining a
database
of
non-profit
community
organizations in the area. The five shires have
a combined population of around 50,000
people, in an area approximately 200km
square: about the size of Belgium or Taiwan.
The largest town has a population approaching
20,000, including outlying areas, while four
other towns have populations between 3,000
and 10,000. Most of the other residents live or
work in very small towns, or on farms.
The existing database of community
organizations contained details of some 3,000
nonprofit organizations and their offices: one
for every 17 people in the region. This ratio
seemed so high that we at first suspected an
error, but later verified it. The database was
held on a PC at a Citizen’s Advice Bureau of
the largest shire council, with copies on one
other PC at the council offices. A separate
software licence was needed for each instance
of the database. The software was proprietary,
written by a Victorian company. Available
statistics, though several years out of date,
showed that around 50% of households in the
region had internet access: one of the lowest
penetration levels in Victoria. We estimated
that around 60% of households had internet
access, at the time of the study in mid-2005.
The focus of the project was to advise
whether it was worthwhile to place this
database on the Web, so that it could be
accessed by everybody - and if so, how this
could best be accomplished. There would
obviously be both a substantial one-off cost
and small continuing costs to maintain the
database in Web format, but these costs would
be offset by the advantages of greater
accessibility. One factor was the state
government’s policy that Melbourne, the
capital of Victoria, was becoming too large
and there was thus a need to decentralize the
population. The region of this study was the
only part of Victoria where the population had
declined between the two previous censuses.
Therefore an online database demonstrating
the number and strength of community
organizations in this region could be a factor in
persuading people to move there from
Melbourne.

One factor to be taken into account was
the existence of several community directory
websites that were obviously unsuccessful:
they were clearly incomplete and/or rarely
visited. It was obvious that without attaining
certain
minimal
thresholds
of
comprehensiveness and user numbers, putting
the existing database online would not be
worthwhile. The size of those thresholds,
however, was unknown.
Method
The study began by searching the Web
for examples of successful publicly-run
community database in areas with similar
population sizes, densities, and levels of
internet access. We found nothing directly
comparable, except in communities with a
much larger population in a much smaller area.
Given that situation, here was a clear example
of the need to reflect on the future, without the
availability of data from the past.
Four
involved:

aspects

of

feasibility

were

(a) how difficult, expensive, and/or time
consuming it would be to transfer the
existing database to online format;
(b) whether the funds required to operate and
maintain a website of the appropriate
scale would match the value that users
would obtain from it;
(c) the mixture of where such funds could be
obtained;
(d) to what extent the needs of potential users
matched the data available, and the
projected online format.
The project team attempted to find a
combination of characteristics of an
information system that would satisfy as many
stakeholders as possible, and be sustainable in
terms of both funding and human involvement.
Though the project specifications did
not require interviewing stakeholders, we
suspected that some of our clients may have
been making unwarranted assumptions about
potential users. We therefore set up a small
research program, and encouraged the clients
to participate actively. Four stakeholder groups
were initially defined: information suppliers
(such
as
community
organizations),
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information users (such as the general public),
resource suppliers (such as shire councils and
software suppliers), and competitors (other
providers of community information to local
publics). By speaking to each of these, we
hoped to be able to detect any assumptional
filters which they - and we - were applying.
Some 60 in-depth interviews were carried out
for the project (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell,
and Alexander, 1995).
Interview sessions typically consisted a
half-day of semi-structured interviews in a
particular location. In each session, around
four full interviews were conducted, mostly
with two researchers present, and often with
multiple respondents. One researcher asked
questions while the other observed and made
notes. The focus of each interview was the
types of community-based information sought
by the respondent, how those needs were
currently fulfilled, and the respondent’s
willingness to adopt an online system.
As most of the stakeholders
interviewed were not well informed about the
issues involved, the work turned out to involve
a good deal of informal education. Because
concepts needed to be explained in the
interviews, the stakeholders interviewed
immediately became atypical of the population
they represented. Therefore this study could
not be considered normal market research, in
terms of drawing conclusions about a
population, based on a random sample of that
population. It was thus a form of action
research, with each semi-structured interview
becoming one reflection on the futures of the
proposed online information system. The
reflectors in this case were the members of the
development team, not the respondents
interviewed; the latter acted to flex the filters
being used by the former.
Following each session of interviews,
the ongoing process of reflection in step 3 was
repeated: bringing into alignment the
reperceived problem situation and the standard
situation. The fieldwork situation was well
suited to reflection. Because we had plenty of
time (with the size of the region, travel times
between most locations were several hours) we
were able to reflect at some length. While
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driving from one location to the next, we
would exchange reflections on the session just
completed, compare it with previous sessions,
and make notes on those findings. As our
perceptions of the interviews varied, these
discussions were often disputatious, exploring
many arguments in detail until we had either
reached
consensus
or
clarified
our
disagreements.
It is relevant to note here that we were
not consciously using the reflection-ascomparison model: we were simply reflecting
on what form the information system might
best take. This paper is not arguing that
reflection-as-comparison is a procedure that
can be consciously applied; rather that, when
futures are reflected on, this model is being
tacitly adopted.
The interviewing process extended over
a month or so. Throughout this period, our
concept of the system to be designed - the
“standard situation” - steadily evolved. We
gradually realized that our initial conception
was a narrow one. In the end, rather than
seeing the task as the design of an IT system,
we came to see it as the design of a social
system. Its components included a sustainable
funding system, an information-updating
system, and an awareness-generating system.
The database system, the initial focus, though
integral to the final design, turned out not to be
a crucial component.
Comparison with reflective models
How does this case study compare with
the two models of reflection presented above:
Dewey’s five-phase model and the reflectionas-comparison model? In retrospect, Dewey’s
model was applied to the case study, to see
how it would compare with the reflection-ascomparison model. As it turned out, Dewey’s
five-phase model could not readily be adapted
to this study; the five phases simply did not
correspond with the reflection process that
took place. However, the reflection-ascomparison model proved to fit the situation
well. In terms of the three-step model
described in section 1.3 above, the reflection
process for managing this case study consisted
of:
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Table 1: Application of reflection-as-comparison model to the case study itself
1. The reflector perceives (through a filter) a current situation,
as problematic in some way.
2. The reflector perceives (also through a filter), a standard
situation as comparison.
3. The reflector considers
3a. reperceiving the current
what changes might be
situation, by varying its filter
necessary to bring the
two situations into
alignment, by any or all 3b. changing the standard
of three methods:
situation
3c. reconfiguring the changes
seen as needed to bring the
two situations into closer
alignment.

The entries in the above table imply
that the reflector is the system designer.
Additional tables could be drawn up for other
roles, particularly information providers and
information users, as well as for information
intermediaries and resource providers for the
system. The main point to be drawn from the
above table is that all three elements (the
current situation, the standard situation, and
the changes needed) were continuously
modified as the interviews progressed, until
researchers and clients were all convinced that
the design for an online system was workable.

CONCLUSION
A key question that now arises is
whether the above case was really an example
of “reflecting on the future” or simply of
planning a system - or, alternatively, could all
planning be considered equivalent to reflecting
on the future? This question may be answered
by returning to Dewey. He states (1933, p.14)
that “Thinking begins in what may fairly
enough be called a forked-road situation, a
situation that is ambiguous, that presents a
dilemma, that proposes alternatives.” This
suggests that planning does not constitute
reflection on the future unless alternatives are
considered. Also, as foreshadowed in the
above discussion on filtering, reinforced by the
observation of Alvesson and Skjöldberg (2000,
p.247) that “reflection occurs when one mode
of thought is confronted by another,” a second
essential component of reflection on the future
is the scrutiny of possible mental filters and
assumptions that may impede clear-sighted
views of potential futures. Lacking the latter

PC database accessible to few people,
so little used.
An online database, accessible to all
with internet access.
Questioning the boundaries of
“community” and “information” and
interviewing a wide range of
stakeholders
Designing a sustainable social system
centred around the online database.
Creating a workable and economical
plan for moving from the present
system to the designed system.

component, reflection on the future could not
move beyond reflection on habitual behaviour.
Nor can reflection on the future be
considered as simply equivalent to reasoning
about future action. The latter term implies a
purely rational process, in which possibilities
are evaluated in a purely cognitive fashion.
But, as noted above, reflection involves an
affective component, and this case study
involved (on the client’s part) strongly held
views about issues such as local control. This
planning was not a purely rational process, but
more one of feeling a way forward to a
solution that we consultants believed would be
viable and the clients and potential users
would find acceptable in terms of their values.
What are the practical implications of
reflection on the future for information
systems practice? Though this paper is not
primarily intended to be normative, the
“triangle tightening” method described at the
end of section 3 above, drawn from the
reflection-as-comparison model, is one that, in
a difficult situation, might usefully be worked
through explicitly. As there are many ways of
achieving such tightening, which would
depend very much on a particular problem
situation, there is no point in trying to
formulate explicit procedures for each of the
four stages involved.
In summary, this paper has attempted
to demonstrate the feasibility of reflecting on
the future. Though Dewey’s (1933) five-phase
model of reflective thinking did not explicitly
allow for reflection on the future, a close
reading of How We Think found that Dewey’s
concept of reflection did not preclude this.
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Strangely, no more recent writing was found
that directly addressed reflection on the future,
so this paper appears to be the first explicit
coverage of this concept.
No suggestion is implied here that the
reflection-as-comparison model should replace
Dewey’s five-phase model, or that either is
prescriptive, urging that “this is how reflection
should be done.” Nor could either model be
empirically verified: mental processes move
too fast and too spasmodically for that. Rather,

each model is a lens that can be adapted to
review and potentially improve a particular
reflective process. When assumptional filters
may impede reflection, or when the output is
to be a normative course of action, the
reflection-as-comparison model might be more
useful;
when
studying
“observational
reflection” and “experimental reflection” in a
scientific mode, as described by Dewey, his
model would be more useful.
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